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Abstract: Industry in all sectors is experiencing a profound digital transformation that puts software at the core of their businesses.
In order to react to continuously changing user requirements and dynamic markets, companies need to build robust workflows that
allow them to increase their agility in order to remain competitive. This increasingly rapid transformation, especially in domains
like IoT or Cloud computing, poses significant challenges to guarantee high quality software, since dynamism and agile short-term
planning reduce the ability to detect and manage risks. In this paper, we describe the main challenges related to managing risk
in agile software development, building on the experience of more than 20 agile coaches operating continuously for 15 years with
hundreds of teams in industries in all sectors. We also propose a framework to manage risks that considers those challenges and
supports collaboration, agility, and continuous development. An implementation of that framework is then described in a tool that
handles risks and mitigation actions associated with the development of multi-cloud applications. The methodology and the tool
have been validated by a team of evaluators that were asked to consider its use in developing an urban smart mobility service and
an airline flight scheduling system.
(This paper is a postprint of a paper submitted to and accepted for publication in IET Software (Vol. 13 , Iss. 3 , 6 2019) and is
subject to Institution of Engineering and Technology Copyright. The copy of record is available at the IET Digital Library)
1 Introduction
Organizations in all industries recognize that they are continuing
their evolution into technology and data companies [1], and that their
business models are being partially or fully transformed by software.
One of the main drivers of this transformation has been the adoption
of paradigms such as IoT or Cloud computing. Cloud computing
allows companies to create new business models that scale depend-
ing on the demand, to migrate their operations to the Cloud, and to
create new service models such as Software as a Service (SaaS) [2].
Large technology companies acknowledge the importance of SaaS
and Cloud computing∗, and users also express their preference for a
subscription-based model since customers become the focus of the
companies instead of the product or the transaction†.
Gartner estimates that by 2022 the main barrier for IoT adoption
will still be security [3]. Northbridge indicated in their latest Future
of Cloud Computing Survey [4] that security was still the top con-
cern and inhibitor of cloud adoption. Furthermore, Article 25 in the
recent GDPR [5] discusses data protection by design and by default,
underlining that considering privacy from the beginning is essential
to address privacy successfully. Additionally there is an increased
need to create trustworthy systems. Just as an example, Yan et al. [6]
published a survey where they describe the different dimensions of
∗https://www.cio.com.au/article/619978/ca-technologies-realigns-saas-y-
ux-driven-try-before-you-buy-market/
†https://www.forbes.com/sites/kimberlywhitler/2016/01/17/a-new-
business-trend-shifting-from-a-service-model-to-a-subscription-based-
model/#1517bc704a5f
trust for Internet of Things systems. Their work concludes that risk
management is an essential piece to guarantee trustworthiness.
Privacy or security-by-design can only be achieved if risk man-
agement is performed from the beginning of the software develop-
ment cycle. Continuous and agile risk management processes are
of great importance in IoT and Cloud computing since these envi-
ronments have a complex and distributed network of services that
increases the attack surface. In the context of multi-cloud applica-
tions, whose components are deployed over different infrastructures
provided by different Cloud Service Providers (CSPs), risk related
to accountability, assurance, agility or even financial aspects become
even more challenging. Risks analysis can also guide the selection
of CSPs, and several authors have proposed methodologies to con-
sider risks in addition to quality of service or cost [7], especially
in the context of multi-cloud applications [8]. Therefore, any com-
ponent, whether running on premises, remotely hosted by a cloud
service provider or offered as a service (by a CSP, a device in
an IoT, etc.), is subject to risk analysis considerations. Poor risk
management allied to a reactive strategy usually forces companies
to continuously re-factor their application architectures to improve
overall software quality and security, incurring in technical debt and
high re-implementation costs [9].
The demands of software driven businesses and the need for fast
innovation are forcing organisations to replace traditional software
development methods such as Waterfall for alternatives that must be
agile and support continuous development and delivery models in an
aggressively changing market. The principles that drive DevOps and
Agile methodologies, with a focus on transparency and collabora-
tion between teams, can help minimise the risks in the application
and the inconsistencies in the way risks are managed. Nevertheless,
the Agile Manifesto (agilemanifesto.org) suggests that Agile teams
focus on delivering the simplest code that supports the needs of their
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customers. In their attempt to adhere to this bottom-up principle,
Agile teams take an incremental and iterative approach that focuses
on delivering individual software capabilities, usually derived from
functional requirements (FRs), diminishing the relevance of system-
wide quality attributes and other aspects related to non-functional
requirements (NFRs), which in general are not well managed in agile
methodologies [10, 11]. This negatively affects code quality and the
quality of the overall software architecture. As a consequence, elici-
tation and management of risks connected to NFRs in Agile become
increasingly important to mitigate the negative effect of relegating
NFRs to second-class citizens.
To our knowledge, only some initial work has been done to con-
ceptualize agile risk management techniques, and effective control
of NFR-related risks in agile methodologies is still to be discussed.
This paper aims at describing challenges that deserve more attention
and then proposing and validating a solution. The paper is organized
as follows. Section 2 analyses how non-functional requirements are
currently managed, and the main obstacles related specifically to
risk management. This analysis will help us describe in Section
3 unsolved problems that pose challenges in agile risk manage-
ment. As a solution to these challenges, in Section 4 we propose a
framework to support a collaborative and agile risk analysis in envi-
ronments that require continuous software delivery, in order to detect
risks and generate sets of mitigation actions. Section 5 describes how
this framework and associated tool set have been implemented for
the development of multi-cloud applications. This tool set was vali-
dated by a team of evaluators whose feedback is analyzed in Section
6. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions and outlines future
lines of work.
2 Related Work
This Section discusses relevant work related to risk management
methods for software development, non-functional requirements
management in Agile methodologies, continuous software develop-
ment, and risk management in a distributed agile development.
Traditional risk management for software development
Implementing risk management processes is essential, specially for
complex, high-risk projects [12]. The business domain can also
affect the need for risk analysis. In this sense, domains that are
less volatile such as supply chain software will not change so
quickly, while other businesses will be continuously looking at
their customers and reacting to changes, modifying the requirements
accordingly.
In general, previous work focuses on the classical schedule, bud-
get and scope risk analysis. When using risk management techniques
for software projects managed through waterfall methodologies,
risks are thoroughly analyzed at the beginning of the project but
when requirements change during the project life-time risk analysis
may become obsolete [13]. Waterfall models assume requirements to
be clearly defined in advance in the design stage and, in general, to
remain fairly immutable, which tends to be unrealistic for projects in
a rapidly changing market. Although there are change management
mechanisms in waterfall processes that permit for requirements to
change, risk management is seldom involved, and the overall risk
analysis is not updated.
There are a number of risk assessment methodologies that include
quantitative metrics, such as the probability of occurrence or the
effort to implement control measures, or even its cost. But oth-
ers consider qualitative metrics, e.g. an appraisal of project staff’s
motivation. There are many quantitative risk methodologies and
tools, like RiskWatch∗ or ISRAM [14] and there are many qual-
itative risk methodologies such as OCTAVE [15], Coras [16] or
one of the most commonly known in the hosted software arena,
STRIDE [17]. OWASP [18] is an open standard trying to define
the risk aware software development. It aims at making software
∗RiskWatch: https://www.riskwatch.com . Accessed: 2017-05-09
security visible, so that organisations are able to make informed deci-
sions. DREAD [19] is a successor of STRIDE and provides another
approach specialised in multi-stack type of applications. Pasha et al.
[20] performed recently a detailed and thorough analysis of different
risk management approaches, both for small and large-scale software
systems. In addition to the state-of-the-art, the authors also proposed
a methodology for risk mitigation that was very complete but lacks
agility.
Agile risk management for software development
In general, it is accepted that managing risks and other non-
functional requirements is ill-defined in agile approaches [21]. Dif-
ferent lightweight NFRs methodologies for agile processes have
been presented such as [22] or [23], where authors combined both
FRs and NFRs in one framework and computed a risk-based require-
ments implementation sequence. Recently, Medeiros et al. [11]
propose an approach to specifying requirements based on design
practices targeted to the developer. It is worth highlighting the work
by Moran [24, 25], where the author explicitly tackles issues related
to risk management for agile software development. Moran pro-
poses a risk modified kanban board and user story map. To our
knowledge, this is the only research work that could be framed in
the research challenges described in this paper. Some products like
codeBeamer∗, which provide scaled agile capabilities, also include
a mechanism to assign risks to both functional and non-functional
requirements. However, their methods to define and manage risks
are very similar to traditional risk management methods.
Most of the traditional risk management methodologies described
above focus on the assessment of risks at a singular stage in time.
However, these techniques do not address one of the most prominent
challenges in today’s adaptive, pivot-oriented world: the challenge
of the continuously evolving risk profile. Managing continuous
changes in software development has been studied from different
perspectives. Practices such as “release early, release often” have
been promoted and adopted in open source software development
[26] and they prove to benefit software quality and consistency [27].
While continuous software integration [28] may be the most well-
known practice in industry related to continuous software develop-
ment, the increasing focus on security and privacy has also generated
work on continuous security and regulatory compliance. Fitzgerald
et al. [29] publishes a roadmap and agenda for continuous software
engineering. Ameller et al. [30] propose to re-plan the current release
every time an activity triggers the need for an updated release plan.
Initially agile methods were devised to fit small projects with co-
located developers in contexts where safety and security were not
critical [31]. However, the use of these methods have been extended
to large projects with distributed development teams [32] and safety-
critical systems [33]. In this last paper, Fitzgerald et al. discuss
R-Scrum (Regulated Scrum), an adaption of Scrum to support com-
pliance in regulated environments, such as medical devices, railway,
or aviation. They propose adding new ceremonies, artifacts and roles
to allow compliance to be assessed at the end of each sprint.
Distributed agile development (DAD) approach is increasingly
adopted by more and more software companies. The idea of DAD
is to combine the quality and speed benefits of agile with the cost
benefits of distributed software development (DSD). This combina-
tion generates significant risks, considering the contradicting nature
of agile and DSD [34]. Shrivastava et al. [35] present a risk man-
agement framework for DAD, studying risks related to software
development life cycle, project management, group awareness, etc.
However, this work is focused on analysing risk factors that repre-
sent a threat to the successful completion of a software development
project, rather than risk threatening non-functional requirements. In
[36], the authors performed a systematic literature review on risks
and control mechanisms for DSD, which could be extrapolated for a
system to support DAD.
∗Risk Management in codeBeamer: https://intland.com/video/test-and-
quality-assurance-management-videos/risk-management-in-codebeamer/
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Finally, it is worth noticing that, in general, security tends to be
considered lower in priority, sometimes unintentionally, when con-
sidered as one of the non-functional requirements of an application.
Continuous security [37] aims at putting security as a high-priority
concept through all phases of the software development process.
Authors detect nine building blocks for continuous application soft-
ware security, including for example employee training and aware-
ness, creating a security software group or giving non-functional
requirements the same importance as functional requirements. As an
example, they suggest creating user stories to capture non-functional
requirements. However, this does not provide a complete solution
to challenges in Section 3 since, for example, collaboration is not
expressly addressed.
3 Challenges in risk management for agile
software development
In this section we present the main challenges for agile risk manage-
ment related to software development. Before describing the chal-
lenges, it is worth discussing how risks are managed in Agile. The
first wave of Agile adoption in many companies involved structur-
ing software development through Scrum teams. When it comes to
application risk management, most companies cannot afford to have
risk management experts in each team. A frequently used solution
is to choose to have staff responsible for detecting the most impor-
tant risks in a centralized way. The use of framework methodologies
to scale Agile, such as SAFe∗, marginally improves this situation.
In this case, organisations structure software development by cre-
ating teams of teams that plan and synchronise their work through
Program Increments (PI). When planning a new PI (typically every
10 weeks), all the actors participating in the software development
process attend the meeting. PI planning usually starts with a vision
and a prioritized list of new features of the product, which are then
decomposed into user stories. This is defined by product owners
and created by the different Agile teams, which are in charge of
drafting plans but also of analyzing risks and impediments. In fact,
user stories replace traditional functional requirements, and describe
intended system behavior. Consequently, risk analysis is done related
to expected features and to these user stories. Because of this, non-
functional requirements, which are usually not represented through
these user stories, tend to be unintentionally diminished in terms
of importance [37] and commonly ignored during the risk analysis.
During PI planning risks are identified by each team, and then aggre-
gated into a program risk sheet that is reviewed in a plenary session.
The group then discusses and categorizes program risks and impedi-
ments. After PI planning, once risks have been classified, and actions
and owners are established, all teams are assumed to be aware of
these potential risks and impediments detected during the meeting
and they are expected to act accordingly throughout the sprints in
that PI. Additionally, the program leadership team will typically
track those risks that are not resolved to ensure the right coordination
occurs. Unfortunately, mapping between risks and user stories do not
usually happen and, since PIs are guided by customer requirements,
the risks detected remain as a relegated part of the development pro-
cess. Risk management in an Agile environment must be integrated
into the process, present in PI planning, in Sprint planning, and in
any other ceremony. It must be a light but continuous activity.
The challenges included in this section are derived from the anal-
ysis of the related work and they are also based on CA Technologies
Rally active coaching. Our conclusions build on top of more than
20 agile coaches operating continuously for 15 years with ever-
increasing scale of engagement. Authors of this paper accumulated
more than 10 years of experience coaching companies to help them
adopt Agile, between 2008 and 2017. We have directly interacted
with more than 1,000 individual contributors. This includes a total
reach of more than 8,000 people on hundreds of development teams
spanning across six continents. Our conclusions are based on face-
to-face coaching work in at least 9 countries and on the interaction
∗Scaled Agile Framework: http://www.scaledagileframework.com
with companies spanning all kinds of industries, from video game
to health care to aeronautics to government, to give some examples.
As a result of these analysis, several challenges have been identified
that need to be tackled to integrate risk analysis, and in particular
risk analysis related to NFRs, in agile software development.
C1. Traditional risk analysis practices for software development
do not easily translate to Agile. Traditionally, risk analysis was
performed "at design time" in the waterfall method, where design,
development and operations are sequential and discrete worlds.
These approaches usually rely on a risk management expert and it
becomes impractical for small and medium enterprises in terms of
cost and finding the proper resources. It also becomes impractical
for companies working towards the adoption of more agile software
development methodologies. There exist some proposals for agile
risk management [24], but they do not take into account existing risk
and threat analysis techniques such as STRIDE [17] or DREAD [19],
or other approaches for managing security risks like OCTAVE [15],
which are more focused on NFRs.
C2. Analysis of risks should be continuous. System and archi-
tectures evolve continuously. In Agile, risk management is often
neglected as part of a backlog or sprint plan, which leads to a view
that it is not important until the later stages of a development project.
In SAFe, PI planning sessions are useful to explore new risks that are
foreseeable at the time of planning. However, a risk analysis every 3
months may not be sufficient when risks are detected by any actor at
any time. This exposes the general problem related to agile method-
ologies failing to effectively address risks and other non-functional
requirements in a structured manner. There is a need for risk analysis
methodologies that are adapted to agile contexts but still achieve the
level of analysis and detail provided by traditional risk assessment
and mitigation techniques, in particular related to NFRs. Fitzgerald
et al. [29] illustrate how Lean Thinking can be applied to contin-
uous software engineering. However, they do not explicitly tackle
challenges related to continuous risk management. Research into
enabling continuous risk management can provide mechanisms and
tools that resolve a challenge of implementing continuous analysis
of risks. It is clear that a balance has to be struck between managing
risk during the development process and not overloading or slowing
the momentum of an agile methodology.
C3. Teams do not have sufficient expertise on risk analysis. Agile
teams are usually cross-functional, optimised for communication
and delivery of value. Although this could facilitate the work of
specialised staff across several teams to analyse risks, allocating
resources with expertise on risk assessment in each team becomes
impractical. It is not possible to have a risk analysis expert in each
agile team. This encourages some level of centralisation, but at the
same time it requires transparency and for agile/Scrum team mem-
bers, a higher capacity to participate and contribute in risk analysis
and propose mitigation strategies when necessary. Consequently,
lack of expertise is an important issue for agile self-managed teams,
but also for small or medium enterprises that cannot afford risk
experts in each team. Detecting the most prominent risks and decid-
ing the best mitigation actions may be a difficult task. Similarly,
deciding the level of likelihood and impact of a particular risk may
also be very subjective and, therefore, difficult to assess and mea-
sure. In addition, domain specific risk analysis further aggravates the
situation as the level of expertise becomes more demanding. While
training is an essential aspect [37], lack of expertise may always be
present and needs to be mitigated.
C4. Tools to manage risk in Agile do not foster collaboration. In
order to improve the control of risk in Agile, tools that allow better
transparency and enable collaboration of all stakeholders involved in
the process are crucial. In this sense, creating new tools that can be
easily embedded with other common agile tools to manage software
development is very important. Current tools to analyse and man-
age risks are quite limited. These are usually implemented through
excel spreadsheets that are shared during PI planning, but do not
allow for further collaboration beyond this face-to-face meeting. In
general, there is a general lack of collaborative tools to engage all
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the stakeholders potentially involved in analysing risks in a trans-
parent way, during PI planning and afterwards. Common generic
tools such as Kanban style boards are increasingly used by software
industry for scheduling work, representing user stories, features, etc.
In this sense, some works suggest the use of risk modified kan-
bans [24, 25]. The detection of new risks or planning mitigation
actions should immediately propagate information and even trigger
warning or actions through these software development management
tools. There is an added challenge to handling risk in a collabora-
tive way. Collective inter-team code ownership makes it difficult to
control risks related to a particular component. In Agile, multiple
teams frequently modify the code associated with a single compo-
nent. Consequently, collective ownership makes it more difficult to
control potential risks related to a particular component. User sto-
ries will impact several components and many of them will typically
need to modify the same shared component. Efficient tools do not
exist to facilitate inter-team risk analysis.
Beyond these four challenges, it is also worth noting that there
is also an intrinsic obstacle to improve risk management related to
the organization culture. Cultural changes of any type require time
and care to be successful. The challenge in this case is to develop a
cultural change methodology that places risk management as a cen-
tral and critical part of an agile methodology. Cultural change of this
type is often top down, implemented by management mandating risk
management as an integral part of every sprint. This has the potential
to lead to varying levels of adoption by the development staff.
4 A New Framework for Agile Risk Management
In this section, we propose a new agile risk analysis framework to
facilitate the creation of tools for agile risk management. This frame-
work addresses the four challenges (C1-C4) described in Section 3.
It is a framework that facilitates translating traditional risk analysis
practices for software development to agile software development
contexts, allowing for continuous risk analysis and permitting the
main stakeholders, from the agile team members to any other level
in SAFe, to collaborate together.
This framework facilitates the control of risk associated to the
assets of a system. The materialization of an asset in each system
may depend on the type of system and the main focus of the risk
analysis. For instance, components in an application architecture of
a software system being developed may be the assets to be ana-
lyzed. However, in a different situation, risks to be analyzed may
be associated with user stories or product features.
We conceive risk management as a continuous activity where
risks may be subject to consideration and evaluation in the differ-
ent stages of the software development life-cycle (C2). Further, the
analysis assessment process is devised in a simple and visual way
that simplifies the collaboration in a multi-disciplinary team of appli-
cation development stakeholders (C4), frequently referred to as the
DevOps Team. We consider recommendations, constraints, and rules
to guide and support the whole team and minimise the impact of
having self-managed teams without adequate risk management capa-
bilities (C3). Lastly, to address the agility challenge (C1) but also
to foster continuity and collaboration, the Kanban process board
philosophy is adopted to produce a risk assessment process board.
Our framework uses a pull system in the style of Kanban, where
the status of each asset with respect to a predefined risk analysis
methodology is expressed through the different columns in the Kan-
ban board. This makes our framework agnostic to any specific risk
analysis methodology. A tool compliant with this framework links a
Kanban-style representation with a particular risk analysis method-
ology, mapping each of the steps of that particular methodology to
one of the columns in the Kanban. This naturally provides a solu-
tion to most of our challenges (C1, C2 and C4), as it provides a
mechanism to include traditional risk analysis methodologies into
an agile-ready tool such as the Kanban. Kanban style boards are
used in continuous deployment environments, fostering collabora-
tion among team members and among teams. It provides an intuitive
visual representation of the current status of your system with respect
to risks/threats and the implemented mitigation strategies. It also
allows introducing new risks and threats and re-evaluating them
in relation to each system asset, aligning with continuous software
delivery approaches.
4.1 Input data assumptions
The framework presented in this paper considers that risk assessment
will rely on three essential sources of information:
• The definition of the system/application’s assets. For example,
these assets can be components of the application architecture, com-
ponents in the infrastructure of a physical system, or user stories or
features of a particular software product.
• The set of constraints or rules that the team has selected. As exam-
ples, these rules may be used to prevent moving an asset until some
restriction has been met, to decide when warnings or specific mes-
sages should be shown, or to indicate that an approval from some
member of the team must be obtained before performing an action.
These rules will enforce the validity of the risk analysis and guide
non-experienced users.
• The knowledge database. This database contains information
about types of assets, risks, and mitigation actions, as well as
their relationships. This information may be used to automate some
processes and provide recommendations that will guide the team
through the different steps of the selected risk analysis methodol-
ogy. This knowledge database may be adapted to the domain of the
application to be developed and extended by the users.
4.2 Mapping of existing risk analysis methodologies
Our framework proposal assumes that methodologies for risk anal-
ysis can be divided into steps that can be implemented sequentially.
Let us define S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} as the set of n steps of a given
methodology. Our framework involves defining a set C of columns
in the Kanban-like board with n columns (C = {c1, c2, ..., cn}).
With these two sets we can create a mapping so that each column of
the Kanban board refers to each step in the methodology. For exam-
ple, OWASP [18] proposes 5 steps for rating risks: identify risks,
estimate likelihood, estimate impact, determine severity of risk, and
decide what to fix. We would then have 5 different columns in our
Kanban.
Fig. 1: Kanban-like board with n columns that stores in a stor-
age system a “Collection of Elements x” generated in each Kanban
column x.
Figure 1 depicts a generic representation of the Kanban approach
proposed in this framework, where each Kanban column generates
a collection of elements. These collections of elements are stored
in a storage system. The actual content and semantics of these data
will depend on the selected risk analysis methodology. For instance,
a column may store collections of vulnerabilities, threats, risks or
mitigation actions, to give some examples.
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4.3 Agile Risk Analysis Automation
As we mentioned before, one of the aims of this framework is to
reduce the impact of having teams with little risk-related expertise by
adding some automation to the framework. This allows team mem-
bers, who may not be experts in risk analysis, to participate in the
implementation of risk analysis methodologies with the support of
the system, thus tackling the challenge depicted in C3. We propose
solving this challenge from two perspectives. One the one hand,
and depending on the risk methodology selected, some columns
may rely on a recommendation system to support the stakeholders.
In this sense, recommendation of vulnerabilities, threats, risks or
mitigation actions may be provided. In multi-tenant environments,
recommendation may be based on the anonymized information col-
lected from other users using a particular tool. All this information
will be available in the knowledge database mentioned before.
On the other hand, our framework defines a set of constraints
over the movements of the assets represented in the kanban-like
board. These constraints depend on the risk analysis process in the
background linked to the board. We propose defining a set of rules
R = {r1, r2, ..., rm} that constrains what type of actions can be
done in a particular step depending on the methodology chosen.
Any tool compliant with this framework should include a Movement
Approval Module. When a component is moved from one origin col-
umn in the Kanban-like board to another target column in the board a
query is generated in order to evaluate a condition relating elements
of the origin column to the elements generated in previous columns.
Fig. 2: Movement Approval Module is activated by each move-
ment of a component between Kanban columns. This module checks
conditions and allows or disallows.
Figure 2 describes this process. The movement of a component
generates a call to the Movement Approval Module. This module is
in charge of accepting or rejecting a drag and drop action. In order
to do this, this module takes into account a set of rules that impose
restrictions on the risk analysis process. A couple of examples of
these rules may be:
• A component cannot be moved from column ci to a column ci+x
where x > 1.
• A component cannot be moved from column ci to a column ci+x
where x > 0, if there exists an element generated in column ci−1
that does not have an element generated in column ci linked to it
(e.g. you cannot move a component to the mitigation actions phase
if there are threats that do not have risks associated to them while the
component was in the risk definition column)
The query generator will generate queries on the storage system
to collect the data necessary to validate the conditions imposed by
those rules.
When a movement is rejected, the tool may generate different
types of feedback including the automatic return of the component
to the origin column, a warning message providing explanations that
justify why the movement is not legal in that context, a warning icon
in the component that provides a justification upon click, etc.
4.4 Additional Aspects
A tool implementing this framework may allow marking some of
the elements generated in a column as “deferred”. When an element
stored in the system is marked as deferred, it means that it can be
omitted by the Movement Approval Module. For instance, a vulner-
ability of a component is detected but the architect knows that this
vulnerability will not be important during the first year of the project.
Its analysis can be deferred. Marking the vulnerability as deferred,
the system would allow the movement of that particular component
with that vulnerability to the following column without blocking the
risk analysis of that component.
The proposed framework also allows for tools to include addi-
tional support forms to prepare a component to be moved to the next
column. These forms may be different and generated ad-hoc depend-
ing on the current column of each component and the semantics of
that particular column in the mapped risk analysis methodology. For
instance, for risk definition we may provide forms to connect each
component to risks and scores for evaluating those risks.
5 Risk Assessment for Multi-cloud Applications
In order to evaluate the proposed framework, we developed a tool to
support a risk assessment methodology for multi-cloud application
development. A multi-cloud application distributes its components
over heterogeneous cloud resources but, from the user’s perspec-
tive, it works in an integrated and transparent way. Risk associated
with these applications include those of its individual components
but also those related to the overall security and to the data commu-
nication among its components. In this Section, we will first detail
the risk methodology that we have selected for our tool and then
describe how it was implemented. In any case, it is worth noting
that the risk methodology is explained for illustrative purposes as an
example. Our agile risk management framework is agnostic to a par-
ticular methodology and other examples with different steps could
be mapped in it.
5.1 Selected methodology for the tool
Figure 3 outlines the flow of the selected Risk Assessment methodol-
ogy, which is compliant with our proposed framework and has been
inspired in the OCTAVE methodology [15]. The selected methodol-
ogy is composed of four main steps to be followed when the team
wants to perform the risk assessment of one of the components:
Risk identification. As mentioned above, a knowledge database
is used to support the user while identifying the risks. Depending on
the type of asset, a subset of the possible risks is shown. The user is
then asked to select one or more risks from the knowledge database.
The user is also allowed to add new risks to the database if the ones
suggested do not cover the specificities of the asset being analyzed.
Risk evaluation. For each risk that the user has selected, an eval-
uation of the likelihood and potential impact that the risk may have is
performed. To evaluate each of the selected risks, the user is required
to provide the likelihood and impact of each threat. With this infor-
mation, the Composite Risk Index (CRI) [38] of the risk is evaluated
following equation 1. Both likelihood and impact are computed on
a scale of 1-9 and the product is quantised on the scale of 1-5. This
implies that the CRI ranges from 1 to 25.
CRI = Likelihood ∗ Impact (1)
Mitigation actions selection. This step allows the user to dis-
cover the means to mitigate each of the risks. After evaluating the
risk scores, risks are categorised according to their CRI level as those
requiring treatment (high and medium risk level) and those that may
not require treatment (low risk level). The knowledge database will
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Fig. 3: Outline of risk assessment process flow. Steps inside the dotted box are performed automatically.
present the most probable mitigation actions, but the user is free to
add any other action from the knowledge base.
Risk status evaluation. Once the selection of the security con-
trols of a risk is complete, the user is asked to select its ROAM
status. ROAM [39] is a common agile management risk mitigation
classification whose acronym stands for:
• Resolved - the risk has been answered and avoided or eliminated.
• Owned - the risk has been allocated to someone who has respon-
sibility for doing something about it.
• Accepted - the risk has been accepted and it has been agreed that
nothing will be done about it.
• Mitigated - action has been taken so the risk has been mitigated,
either reducing the likelihood or reducing the impact.
It is important to note that only risks with status Accepted or Miti-
gated are considered as fully addressed. Status Owned is treated as
a pending status therefore the risk mitigation analysis must continue
and Resolved status eliminates the prior risk analysis all together
since the threat is considered no longer relevant.
5.2 Implementation of the tool
Once the methodology was clear, a tool was developed to support
the development of multi-cloud applications. This tool was also
developed to address the prior challenges identified.
As we described in the previous section, our risk assessment
framework relies on three sources of information:
• The definition of the application assets: in this case, the assets
that the tool will consider will be components of the architecture
of the application. Components may range from small components
of the architecture in the form of specific purpose libraries running
on premises to complex and general components in the architec-
ture including sub-components or complex services offered by cloud
service providers, by devices in an IoT ecosystem, etc. In the area
of cloud applications, there have been many attempts at defining a
domain-specific language (DSL) that can describe cloud applications
[40–42]. It is worth mentioning that the OASIS technical committee
called TOSCA (Topology and Orchestration Specification for Cloud
Applications) is developing an open standard that provides a lan-
guage to describe cloud components and their relationships [43]. In
our case we have chosen CAMEL (Cloud Application Modelling
and Execution Language) [44], a DSL akin to TOSCA that allows
users to specify multiple aspects of cross-cloud applications, such as
provisioning and deployment, service-level objectives, metrics, scal-
ability rules, providers, security controls, execution contexts, and
execution histories. Using CAMEL, the development team is able
to describe the architecture and the deployment requirements with a
high-level of abstraction and independently of any cloud provider.
• The set of rules that the team has selected: for simplicity, we have
not established roles and every user has the same responsibility over
the risk assessment process. The rules that have been incorporated
to the tool are: (i) A component cannot be moved from column ci to
a column ci+x where x > 1; (ii) a component cannot be moved to
the Mitigation actions selection unless all the risks have been evalu-
ated and their CRI calculated; (iii) a component cannot be moved to
the Evaluation column unless all the risks have at least one security
control; and (iv) the risk analysis of a component cannot be consid-
ered as fully addressed unless all the risks have been accepted or
mitigated.
• The knowledge database: in order to assess the risks, in our tool
we use a risk model based on the OWASP risk modelling [45] and we
gather information from different sources, such as the OWASP TOP
10 threats catalogue [46] or NIST SP 800-53 r4 [47]. This knowl-
edge database is based on a predefined set of possible risks (here
called threats) and a matching set of mitigation actions (here called
security controls) which needs to be fulfilled by the application
designer. Each of these security controls come with the definition
and measuring technique on how the security control should be
fulfilled.
Once the architecture is ready, the components to be analyzed
from a risk perspective are imported into the Kanban. It is impor-
tant to note that we have added an initial state for those components
for which we have not started analyzing risks and a final state for
those components for which the risk analysis is finished. Also, we
have decided to combine the four steps of our methodology into two
steps: identification and evaluation of risks, and selection and eval-
uation of mitigation actions. Thus, the four states and columns that
our Kanban offers are:
• Components definition, which is the initial step for all the compo-
nents pending their risk assessment.
• Risks definition, where the users would move the components to
start the risk assessment. In this step, the users are asked to decide
the risks that affect the component. Moreover, in this step the users
are also asked to evaluate the likelihood and impact of the risks.
• Security controls definition, where the users are presented with
the possible security controls of each risk depending on the CRI.
Once the users select the security controls, they are also asked to
apply ROAM to the risks.
• Validation, for all the components that have finalized the risk
assessment. Only those components whose risks have been Accepted
or Mitigated should be in this state. The last step required from the
user is the acceptance of the level of the risk mitigation status. The
Validation step provides an overview summary of the choices made
in previous steps.
5.2.1 Risks definition: In this step, the user chooses the threats
that the component under consideration is susceptible to. Once
threats are selected, they are automatically classified in the STRIDE
[17] categories (Spoofing identity, Tampering, Repudiation, Infor-
mation disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege).
Regarding the evaluation of the risks, the likelihood and conse-
quence scales chosen are inspired from [17]. For simplification, CRI
is also provided as an option for the user to provide likelihood and
impact for each of the STRIDE categories, and the same scores are
applied to all the threats categorised under each of the 6 categories
of STRIDE). In our risk assessment process, the Likelihood and
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Impact values are further computed from a set of categorisations-
based influencers taken from OWASP approach to the CRI. These
influencers simplify the process and include concepts both from a
technical perspective (ease of exploit, skill level of the threat agents,
etc.) and the business perspective (financial damage, reputation dam-
age, etc.). These sub-values are grouped by the type of factors and
represented by the value in a scale of 0-9 where 0 represents a very
unlikely scenario and in contrast 9 represents a very high likelihood
of the factor to occur. Detailed description of all the factors can be
found in [45]. Most of the Impact factors are pre-populated with
values based on our threat catalogue.
In our tool, selecting the Details button for a component in the
STRIDE based Risk Assessment column would bring up the screen
in Figure 4. This shows the STRIDE Risk Assessment process and
the actions that need to be followed to handle this assessment. Figure
4 shows several rows representing the STRIDE defined threat cate-
gories, for example Tampering, Information Disclosure, Denial of
Service. It also shows the likelihood and impact specification using
the OWASP guidelines to compute likelihood and impact based on
Threat Agent factors, Vulnerability factors and both technical and
business impact factors. As many of these areas that are relevant
have been completed, the user can move to the next stage of the risk
assessment.
5.2.2 Security controls definition: Within the cloud security
arena, this can be done by selecting the security controls the provider
needs to guarantee in order to mitigate the threat. As indicated
before, NIST SP 800-53 r4 [47] maps security controls to the threats
and indicates the threat levels that require treatments. Based on this
mapping, the required controls are obtained for the threats selected
by the users. These controls are then presented to the user as sugges-
tions but, as mentioned before, the user is free to extend the choice
to all the available security controls if desired. Selected controls are
further mapped to the CCM (Cloud Control Matrix) controls from
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [48].
Figure 5 shows the contents of a component that is in this stage.
As we can see, in addition to the security controls, the user is also
asked to apply ROAM to the risks.
We should keep in mind that we should repeat the whole risk anal-
ysis process for any possible risk that we may detect for a given
component, and that this process should be iterated as many times as
dictated by the iterations of the development process. Consequently,
components that are in the Validation state may be moved to previ-
ous states if necessary. It is important to note that in any state, the
user can request the tool to output a report detailing the risk assess-
ment status of each component, including the risks identified, their
status, and their security controls.
6 Results
Research into adoption of risk management as an integral part of
Agile requires both qualitative and quantitative analysis. A survey
can help us gather quantitative figures while a qualitative approach
using an intensive case study is an effective way of understanding
a team’s approach. Case studies not only deliver insight into the
thinking and ideas of a development team but allows their actions,
behaviour and body language to be observed and recorded for anal-
ysis. A combination of both approaches compliment each other and
will facilitate further analysis and development of relevant hypothe-
ses. To address this objective, we will firstly introduce the case
studies and analyze the selected team of evaluators before presenting
the results of the evaluation obtained through surveys. Then, we will
also discuss the opinions of the evaluators regarding how relevant
risk management is when compared to other tools used to develop
multi-cloud applications.
6.1 Use cases description
For this evaluation, two different real case studies were chosen: an
urban smart mobility service and an airline flight scheduling system.
The smart mobility application should provide efficient and opti-
mal route planning by considering road, traffic, energy consumption,
and weather conditions. The urban mobility service was proposed
to have 4 components: the smart mobility engine that would serve
as orchestrator, the consumption estimator that would calculated the
energy needed on each trip, the multi-modal journey planner that
would offer the optimal trip, and the database.
Airline scheduling is a complex scenario since each airline must
react to actions of the rest in order to keep the schedules up to date.
The flight scheduling system was proposed as an application with 5
components: the central gateway that would serve as entry point, the
read module that would query fleet and airline-related information,
the write module that would update fleet and airline-related informa-
tion, the web interface that the final user would interact with, and a
set of additional cloud services, such as event managers or databases.
In both use cases the objective was to provide a distributed
solution that could reduce the points of failure and offer greater
Fig. 4: STRIDE based Risk Assessment step
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flexibility. Moreover, these application may also become Platform-
as-a-service solutions that could scale or do load balancing as
needed. With this plan, a user-centered evaluation was performed
to assess if the tool developed fulfilled the needs of the users.
6.2 Evaluators team
To evaluate our methodology and our tool, we selected a group
of evaluators from Lufthansa Systems and Tampere University of
Technology. We were looking for evaluators that were not famil-
iar with the tool, who were experienced defining architectures with
CAMEL, who had a limited level of expertise on security, and who
covered different levels of expertise in cloud development. Figure 6
shows different information of the 9 evaluators. The figure shows
how the job positions are distributed, what was their relation to
cloud-based application development, and how familiar they were
with risk assessment. We can see how most of the evaluators were
partly familiar or very familiar with the development of cloud appli-
cations, whereas most of them were only slightly familiar with risk
assessment. In this sense, according to evaluators’s experience, risk
management followed a quite rudimentary approach, without a for-
mal or systematic approach to evaluate risk and tackle attack vectors.
In the case of Lufthansa Systems, previous developments were for
internal use and risks were not a priority. In general, risks were man-
aged during the early planning phases (and in most of the cases only
once) as it was considered as a one-time activity rather than a con-
tinuous process. The applied tool for this exercise was usually MS
Excel, and in most of the cases there was only one person responsible
for filling out the sheets with mostly NFR related risks. For Tampere
University of Technology, focus was put on solving the functional
requirements of the application. When having meetings with poten-
tial customers, they gathered their security concerns as a checklist
of non-functional requirements. Then these were ordered by priority
and tackled with security controls. In this sense, risk management
was mostly done on the fly.
Finally, and although not shown in those figures, it is also worth
noting that all the evaluators considered themselves as having a good
knowledge of Agile.
6.3 Use cases evaluation results
For the evaluation we divided the evaluation group into 2 teams.
Each team was asked to consider a different use case and then we
collected their feedback in the form of a survey.
Figure 7 presents the answers given by the evaluators to different
questions about the proposed risk analysis tool. According to the
evaluators, the tool supports DevOps collaboration and it is efficient
in the security risks definition aligned with the application security
requirements. We can also see how the majority of the evaluators
agree that the tool supports the agile management of multi-cloud
applications. This shows that our proposed tool can help mitigate
three of the challenges (C1, C2, and C4) presented above related
to the lack of agile tools, the need for continuous risk assessment,
and to the lack of collaboration. Given that the evaluators consider
the tool to be easy to use and the supported process to help the risk
analysis process, we also consider that our tool helps minimizing
challenge C3, since it can help alleviate the lack of security expertise
in the teams. The evaluators considered that the output of the tool is
easy to understand but although the tool is easy to use, they believe
that the messages and tooltips shown were sometimes confusing. We
consider that some future work could be dedicated here to improve
the understandability of the output of the tool.
In general, the evaluators agree that the tool achieves its objec-
tives and that it allows the definition of all the security threats and
the security controls of a multi-cloud application. Table 1 presents
some figures regarding efficiency collected during the evaluation.
The timing results indicated by the evaluation teams are aligned with
the values obtained in internal tests performed in continuous evalu-
ation by the tool developers. Scenario 2 was more complex, as we
can conclude seeing that times are larger and that the number of
controls supported was lower. As a general rule, the estimated time
saved by using the tool is a very complex question. The evaluators
could not give any estimation on that, because many of them did
not perform any risk assessment before, although they do agree and
recognize the benefit of using the tool. More experiments should be
performed in the future to actually compare time using a traditional
risk assessment tool, to be able to provide a more accurate answer.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that some evaluators commented
that perhaps the risk analysis should be done before modelling the
application. Our methodology requires an initial model to offer a first
analysis of risks but, obviously, it supports iterating as many times
as possible between model definition and risk analysis as needed.
Fig. 5: Security Controls Definition step
IET Research Journals, pp. 1–11
8 c© The Institution of Engineering and Technology 2015
Table 1 Efficiency questions related to risk assessment of a multi-cloud application.
Efficiency questions Scenario1 Scenario2
Avg. Median Avg. Median
Time spent defining the risks of one component (minutes) 23 30 24.8 26
Time spent defining the risks of the whole application (minutes) 82 90 143 90
Estimated time saved (by using the tool) defining the risks of the application (minutes) 185 60 247,5 195
Number of required security controls that could be specified in the risk analysis 67 86 36.5 11.5
(a) Distribution of job positions.
(b) Familiarity with cloud-based application development.
(c) Familiarity with risk assessment.
Fig. 6: Analysis of the group of evaluators.
6.4 Risk analysis relevance
Finally, in order to understand the relevance of managing risks when
creating a multi-cloud application, we asked evaluators to rank our
risk management tool with respect to other tools to build and secure
multi-cloud applications, both in terms of importance and innova-
tion. This list of tools is based on the tools proposed in [49], where
the authors propose a framework to support the security-intelligent
lifecycle management of distributed applications over heterogeneous
cloud resources. After gathering the results, the ordered list of tools
was:
1. a risk analysis tool
2. a security assurance platform for monitoring
3. a decision support system for Cloud Service Selection
4. an Service Level Agreement (SLA) Generator
5. a deployer to support distributed deployment
As we can see, the risk analysis tool is the one valued highest,
where 4 out of the 9 evaluators ranked it as their first choice.
7 Conclusions
Risk assessment is often an afterthought, as it happens with security
as a whole. Risk assessment is usually performed in a quick and
unstructured manner or even completely skipped. As a consequence,
risk assessment often leads to ineffective and inaccurate analysis.
Considering risk management properly in the agile development
process generates a number of challenges to be solved. This paper
combines the information collected from previous works together
with years of internal experience to describe several pending chal-
lenges for risk management. The proposed challenges also cover one
area that is often neglected: team cultural change. By creating tools
that support the aforementioned challenges we will enable faster and
more comprehensive adoption of agile risk management tools and
techniques.
In order to cover the challenges identified in this paper, we have
proposed a framework that is based on an online Kanban-like tool
that is agile (challenge C1) and fosters collaboration (challenge C4)
by offering a visual representation of the proposed risks/threats and
their related mitigation actions. This framework proposes using rec-
ommendations and rules to offer automation and guidance to the
team. This makes risk assessment attainable and usable even by
software designers that have good technical skills but may not be
security and risk analysis experts (challenge C3). Moreover, since
the knowledge database can be tailored to the specific domain of the
application, a finer granularity in the risks and mitigation actions
suggested can also be achieved. Our proposal allows the natural
introduction of new risks and threats and re-evaluation of the level
of security related to each system component following continuous
software delivery methods (challenge C2).
In this paper, we have also described an implementation of the
framework in order to perform a user evaluation. From the results
of this evaluation we can conclude that an agile risk analysis tool is
one of the main tools needed to develop a secure multi-cloud appli-
cation. Moreover, our tool and selected methodology received a very
positive feedback from the evaluations and were able to satisfy the
needs to tackle all challenges.
For future work, apart from some GUI glitches, for future ver-
sions we would like to improve the scalability of the tool by offering
operations that can affect multiple components at the same time or
that can allow the user to add or remove groups of security controls
in one operation. We would then like to perform a new evaluation
in order to assess the impact of our changes and to better measure
how this methodology improves past techniques and how cultural
change can be pushed via an agile tool. Another important line of
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Fig. 7: Results of the evaluation.
future work is adding automation, so that the tool can learn from the
users’ past behaviour and proactively suggest actions or add risks for
components similar to those that the user has analysed in the past. In
this sense, developing a tool that could automatically suggest risks
from the definition of the application components would boost the
impact on teams with little risks-related experience. From a differ-
ent perspective, we also plan to apply this methodology and develop
a similar tool to handle risks associated to software development
planning.
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